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SECTOR

Philanthropy and Mistakes:
An Untapped Resource
Robert Giloth, Ph.D., and Susan Gewirtz, Annie E. Casey Foundation

Introduction

Key Points

An astute and longtime observer of the philanthropic world scolded foundations several years
ago for not consistently sharing their lessons about
investments that did not work as intended — what
some might call “failures” or “mistakes” (Frumkin,
2006). This call for transparency was not simply
about the need for accountability; it represented
the belief that foundations collectively are missing
an important opportunity to improve the design
and implementation of their social investments.1

· Sharing and leveraging lessons learned from mistakes is an important but underutilized resource to
improve philanthropic investments and nonprofit
performance.

Not all foundation mistakes are the same, but
three aspects of philanthropic investing are
mistakes that can be avoided. First, foundations
mismatch their reach and their resources. They
sometimes overreach in the ambition of their
investments, thinking they alone can address the
complexity and scale of important social issues.
Conversely, foundations sometimes underperform by not taking substantial risks on behalf
of change and innovation. Second, foundations
sometimes ignore the need to generate knowledge, by failing to commit to and invest in evaluation, self-reflection, and communicating lessons
to relevant audiences. Third, foundations are
sometimes not transparent about their knowledge
of what works and what does not.
Not as easy to avoid are “constructive failures”
— those mistakes that occur in spite of thought1

This article draws on Giloth (2004, 2007).
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· Philanthropic mistakes extend beyond the results
of program evaluations to include questions of
mission, role, investment strategies, and implementation.
· Distinguishing between “constructive” and “nonconstructive” mistakes focuses attention on those
factors that shape the outcomes for even the most
well-designed investments.
· Sharing and reflecting upon mistakes has the
potential to improve philanthropic capacities for
anticipation, learning, and adaptation.
· Philanthropy must recognize the sometimes blurry
lines between success and failure, constructive
and nonconstructive mistakes, and philanthropic
and nonprofit sector accountability.

ful design, implementation, and evaluation by
foundations and their nonprofit partners (Cohen
& Gooch, 1991). These failures are unexpected
given the state of theory, experience, and best advice. Such failures call into question foundations’
assumptions about roles, problems, strategic
interventions, implementation, partners, indicators of success, and methods of documentation.
Constructive failures provide invaluable insights
into problems and solutions, laying the groundwork for the next generation of investments.
Constructive mistakes can be acts of commis-
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sion or omission — that is, opportunities that are
pursued or neglected.

• The hubris of acting alone or thinking one can
change the world, taking on challenges beyond
the scope of any one investor or stakeholder
Philanthropy has recently accelerated its sharing
(Wooster, 2006).
and reflecting on foundation failures (Strom, 2007). • “Groupthink” (individuals in a group thinking
The Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Chicago
too much alike) blinds decision makers to alterCommunity Trust set the tone in the 1990s with
native courses of action and contrary evidence,
their critical reflections about major communitysometimes leading them to folly and tragedy.
building initiatives (Frumkin, 2006). More recently, • Losing focus and failing to pay attention
the Irvine, Gates, Heinz, Hewlett, and McConnell
enough to do routine tasks well.
Clark foundations have shared what did not work
• Trial-and-error mistakes, which stem from
in specific education, youth, and communityprototyping new, untested ideas, resulting in
building investments (Strom, 2007). In addition,
a high likelihood of failure. Different types
the 2008 Council on Foundations national conferof trial-and-error mistakes occur at difference in Washington, D.C., featured a workshop on
ent phases of the development or innovation
“The Advantage of Sharing Failures.”
cycle, whether in model-building or scalingup demonstrations. Knowing where you are
This article discusses how foundations and their
in the innovation cycle and what you need
to learn is critical for creating durable social
nonprofit partners might think about failure and
inventions.
share their hard-learned lessons. We first distinguish among different types of mistakes and how • Unintended consequences of social action
(McKnight, 1995). Mistakes of this kind are
they relate to specific types of foundation investespecially apparent when the goal of the investments. The article then discusses three examples
ment is to change systems — educational, ecothat represent different types of mistakes that
logical, or community based. As systems adjust
foundations and their nonprofit partners make.
or try to maintain the status quo in response
Finally, we offer lessons to foundations about
to the intervention, the repercussions of trying
adapting, learning, and sharing in the face of
to do good might be seen as violating the basic
failure. The overarching argument of this article
rule “do no harm.”
is that foundations face certain dilemmas in their
grantmaking that are related to mistakes and that
need to be acknowledged and reflected on.
Philanthropic Dilemmas — Mission and

Culture

Thinking About Mistakes
A rich and somewhat iconoclastic wave of literature has begun to explore the power mistakes
have to generate innovation in the nonprofit
sector (Giloth, 2004; Brehm, 2008). Mistakes are
valued in some ways, even though culturally many
nonprofit organizations find it difficult to talk
about and acknowledge failure. In the business
world, for example, one’s prospects are related to
one’s resume of constructive mistakes or failures,
regardless of whether this is made explicit. Entrepreneurs pick themselves up and try again.
There are several types of common mistakes2:
2
Robert Hughes of the Robert Woods Johnson Foundation divides constructive failures into “valid failures” and
failures resulting from “environmental and policy” shifts.
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Foundations contribute to mistake making in two
fundamental ways.
The first has to do with their mission and culture,
as embodied in the roles and investment approaches of foundations. The very nature of
foundation resources and governance as well as
their high public profile can lead to some predictable mistakes.
Part of the nature of foundations is their ideological assumptions or preferences, which can narrow
the design and effectiveness of social investments,
although in the aggregate they may stimulate a
healthy competition of ideas. Many times, their
ideology leads to “either/or” thinking rather
than to “both/and” thinking, thereby limiting the
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reach, adaptability, and effectiveness of foundation investments.
The old story of the hedgehog and the fox,
reinterpreted in 2001 in Collins’ Good to Great,
underscores the advantages and perils of foundations doing only a few things well, compared
to having multiple irons in the fire. Foxes know
many things and are always trying out new approaches; hedgehogs have one unifying theory
and are always setting specific goals to move
the world in that one direction. This parable
plays out in complex and unexpected ways,
however, because even foundations that do
multiple things — the foxes — may do them in
only one or two ways, such as only taking overthe-transom proposals. Likewise, the foundation that appears to emulate the hedgehog may,
in fact, use multiple philanthropic approaches,
such as grants, social investments, consulting,
operating programs, technical assistance, and
advocacy.
Similarly, it is too simple to contrast the active
social investor and the reactive grantmaker. The
investor may be expertise-driven, drawing on
favored experts to design foundation investments
and solicit partners. The reactive grantmaker, on
the other hand, may place more emphasis on and
value in external entrepreneurs and organizational capacity in addition to the good idea, and thus
be more open to the whole world.
Finally, one might think that the transparent
grantmaker is a clear winner over more secretive foundations. While true overall — and being
transparent about mistakes, after all, is the focus
of this article — the secretive grantmaker may
actually be more humble and prefer a behind-thescenes approach, while the transparent grantmaker may sometimes just be a better communicator,
not necessarily a more effective one.

Philanthropic Dilemmas — Operational
Strategies
The second major way in which foundations contribute to mistakes is in how they implement their
mission through their investments and how they
carry out social policy initiatives. As with mis-
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sion and culture, foundations differ dramatically
in investment approaches, but no one approach
guarantees a consistent escape from mistakes.
Rather, these differences lead to different kinds of
mistakes on the ground.

One might think that the
transparent grantmaker is a
clear winner over more secretive
foundations. While true overall
— and being transparent about
mistakes, after all, is the focus
of this article — the secretive
grantmaker may actually be more
humble and prefer a behindthe-scenes approach, while
the transparent grantmaker
may sometimes just be a better
communicator.
Whether foundation initiatives follow a blueprint or grow and adapt investments organically
is a perennial problem, especially for national
foundations that invest large sums of money
with relatively little local knowledge and high
expectations. Another version of this challenge
is the branded single-foundation effort versus
collaborative grantmaking with local funders,
which inevitably requires more flexibility to meet
the needs of all investors. Still another variant is
a program replication versus a design replication,
which tries to transplant design ideas into new
contexts.
Blueprinting is rigid in many respects, but defining guidelines and metrics is essential for generating serious knowledge, especially knowledge that
can be compared with results elsewhere. At the
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same time, the organic, local approach may be a
substitute for a lack of ambition or may simply be
renaming what is already being done. Although
blueprinting can provide a focused way to cut
through competing local agendas, wide local
ownership is needed in the long run if successful
investments are to be sustained.

There is no one tried-and-true way
of doing effective grantmaking,
although various advocates would
like us to think so. Mistakes occur
no matter what the approach,
especially when an organization
follows an approach rigidly.

communities. Ironically, these objectives can
pull nonprofits in different directions. Highperforming nonprofits often resist blueprinting,
and yet, they are the most capable of fulfilling
foundation expectations for ideas, results, and
scale. On the other hand, places of need and the
organizations that serve them tend to be more
willing to adopt foundation blueprints and put
up less resistance to foundation knowledge and
assistance. But in too many cases, they cannot
deliver on the results.
There is no one tried-and-true way of doing effective grantmaking, although various advocates
would like us to think so. Mistakes occur no
matter what the approach, especially when an
organization follows an approach rigidly. Foundations would be best served by understanding the
dilemmas all grantmaking poses and by being
aware of the potential pitfalls and mistakes.

Examples of Philanthropic Mistakes
Another version of the blueprint/organic challenge relates to grantee engagement and accountability. High engagement with grantees, favored
by venture investors, promises “added value”
but at its worst descends into technical interference and micromanagement. Low engagement
may signal that making the grant was the high
point of the relationship or may communicate
the message that grantees should only come back
when they have results or a serious problem to
talk about. Accountability, as we have seen, can
be present or absent with varying intensities of
engagement.
The duration of foundation investments can be
controversial as well. Many foundations use a
one- to three-year grant cycle, which doesn’t
even give grantees long enough to fail. Without
failing, sometimes it’s difficult to learn and succeed. On the other hand, longer term, five- to
eight-year initiatives can discourage urgency
and unconsciously create the incentive for drift
and lack of focus, not only for implementers
but also for foundations whose program officers
eventually move on to other opportunities. Most
foundations want results, but they also want
to help the most underserved populations and
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Three examples of foundation mistakes illustrate
the dilemmas of grantmaking. None of these differently sized and structured cases fits the image
of the big, single foundation-generated initiative
that failed. What these examples highlight are the
more nuanced partnerships between nonprofit
grantees and foundations. Who makes and owns
each operational or strategic mistake is a matter
of perspective, especially when projects have a
blueprinting component. A cross-cutting theme
in all of these mistakes is a failure to evaluate,
document, and communicate.
All in the Neighborhood?
When failures are not made transparent or when
they are not analyzed and digested fully, they
endure below the surface of community affairs,
popping up when least expected to do more damage. In Chicago, when foundations began talking
about forming a funder collaborative for workforce development, foundation program officers
raised the specter of a past funder-collaborative
failure, the Austin Labor Force Intermediary, or
ALFI, as an impediment to the new collaboration.
Unfortunately, almost all of the evaluations, foundation files, and key players related to this effort
were nowhere to be found.
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During the early stages of the design and implementation of the Casey Foundation’s Jobs Initiative (JI) in the mid-1990s, we made a number of
grants to facilitate our learning about the challenges of workforce innovation on the ground.
South Shore Bank and its nonprofit affiliate, The
Neighborhood Institute (TNI), approached us to
invest in ALFI, a new and ambitious project that
was part of The Austin Initiative, Shore Bank’s
expansion into the west-side Chicago neighborhood of Austin.
The protracted, multiyear planning process for
ALFI produced a price tag of several million dollars per year for a very ambitious initiative. The
key assumption informing ALFI was the perception that Chicago’s west side suffered from a disconnection between available jobs in the neighborhood and neighborhood job seekers. This
contrasted with the growing belief that urban job
seekers should be connected to concentrations of
regional jobs. Research showed that few west-side
residents worked for neighborhood businesses,
mostly small manufacturers, yet these firms
employed many people in the aggregate. ALFI
represented a new vision of community building
— constructing a preparation pipeline to connect
residents to neighborhood jobs, which would enhance local income and partnerships that would
contribute to rebuilding the whole neighborhood.
ALFI would invest in both the supply and demand
sides of the labor market as well as in bridging
mechanisms that would bring them together.
ALFI failed to get traction after several years and
ultimately closed down. There were many reasons
for this failure. Early on, the over-the-top budget
was cut in half to what was seen as a more appropriate size, although the program’s complex and
ambitious theory of change was left relatively untouched. The Ford, MacArthur, Casey, and Mott
foundations joined other local funders without
sufficient public sector buy-in, except for targeted
projects that launched ALFI as a welfare-to-work
project. Foundations should have questioned the
overall feasibility more closely and considered revising the theory of change when the budget was
cut. A part of the problem was that funders were
attracted by a high-performing grantee, South

Winter 2009 Vol 1:1

Shore Bank, even though community building
and workforce development in the Austin neighborhood were not its strengths. Foundations went
along with the project and, perhaps because ALFI
really was not central to their portfolios, took
their eyes off the ball.
A related problem was that, despite the rhetoric of partnerships, ALFI essentially created a
new organization and brought in new executive
staff. The Austin community certainly required
expanded nonprofit capacity, maybe more than
existing nonprofits realized, but ALFI failed to
take advantage of significant experience already
in the community, especially related to working
with local industries and designing and implementing job-training and placement programs.
At the same time, ALFI lost some degree of focus
by having to work with so many neighborhood
nonprofits, not all of whom had the capacity or
interest in collaborating.
Attempting to bring off an ambitious agenda with
insufficient funding and without strong community and public-sector partners ultimately undid
ALFI, and mixed goals didn’t help. Was ALFI trying to grow local businesses, especially minority
businesses, through technical assistance, mentoring, and access to capital? Was ALFI trying to
maximize the hiring of neighborhood residents
into local jobs and careers? Was Shore Bank trying to rebuild the neighborhood? ALFI needed to
do all of the above, but having one start-up organization simultaneously doing all of these things
in the same neighborhood would have been a
tough charge, even for the highest performing
organization.
Finally, key design assumptions proved to be
incorrect or difficult to build on. ALFI was unable
to place many local residents in local jobs and did
not mount a larger effort to place people in jobs
outside of Austin. Residents lacked requisite skills
and readiness, and, as it turned out, firms lacked
jobs and an openness to creating community
employment opportunities.
In some sense, ALFI was another case of a theorydriven investment by a high-performing grantee
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that could not or would not adapt. ALFI pushed
forward despite a lack of resources and in the face
of skeptical questions. Funders invested in a formative review of ALFI by Rainbow Research, Inc.,
that raised many issues and challenges, but key
questions were not asked or answered until staff
exited or funding dried up (Rainbow Research,
Inc.,1995). Funders gradually peeled off, leaving
ALFI to make its own way on a downward path.
Foundations failed to give a high-performing
grantee appropriate feedback: that ALFI’s design
was too complicated and infeasible in many
respects. But just as important, no one told the
complete story of ALFI, so knowledge about how
to link community building, workforce development, and economic opportunity suffered.
It would have been a cautionary tale for many
subsequent initiatives, including those efforts to
connect job seekers to regional jobs. That lack of
documentation and reflection about this experience was perhaps the biggest mistake in the end.
The Dangers of Outcome Measures3
The nonprofit world has had an ongoing debate
about the importance of results and outcomebased thinking. Although most agree that using
data, setting targets, and managing for results are
critical elements of accountability, continuous
improvement, and organizational learning, there
are many concerns as well. For example, does a
focus on results crowd out innovation and drown
out new voices or important stories? The mistake
we focus on is not anticipating the unintended
consequences of establishing “robust” indicators
of program success.

employment-training field by adopting higher
standards and evidenced-based models of program design such as the Center for Employment
Training (CET). A nonexperimental evaluation
design showed income and retention gains and
underscored the importance of integrating human service supports, work readiness training,
education and training, and targeting the right
jobs (Abt Associates & New School University,
2003)
The JI defined and counted job placements as
those that had a starting wage of $7 per hour and
were full time. In the mid-1990s this wage was
above minimum wage, and several sites set the
wage threshold even higher. For several sites that
were serving very hard-to-employ individuals,
this meant that many of their placements did not
count, which lowered their placement rate among
people enrolled in the program.
The JI focused on keeping participants employed
for one year, a longer term retention goal than
the existing standard of three months, to focus
investments on long-run labor force attachment
and success. Moreover, the JI adopted a conservative definition of retention, requiring workers to
remain in the same- or higher-wage job and have
only short interruptions in work, and discounting participants who dropped out of sight, thus
lowering retention numbers.

Though the use of “robust” metrics encouraged
learning about job-retention strategies, it took
place in a somewhat self-contained hothouse
environment that did not reflect what other investors required. Rather than encouraging other
public and private investors to change their ways
The Casey Foundation’s Jobs Initiative illustrates
and adopt more meaningful indicators, the JI
the problem of how choosing complicated or
inadvertently encouraged its sites to keep double
higher standards can lead to effective programs’
looking worse than other programs in their com- books to satisfy the demands of JI funders and
munities and to evaluations that minimize results. others who were not involved.
The JI was an eight-year, six-city, $30-million effort to connect low-income, urban communities
to good jobs and regional economies. It sought
to address the poor performance of much of the
3

Drawn from Gewirtz (2007).
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In deconstructing this mistake, the Casey
Foundation came to believe that it was correct
in setting ambitious targets with precise and
robust measures, but it erred by establishing
performance measures in isolation from other
workforce actors in the JI communities. By
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recognizing that the low-income earners and job
seekers that JI sites would be serving often had
work experience but limited continuous attachment, it made sense to push for longer term labor
market attachment. Recent research suggesting
that wage progression for low-income earners
often involves changing jobs has also affirmed the
decision to allow for multiple jobs with short gaps
in between to be taken into account when defining retention.
The Casey Foundation, however, did not sufficiently take into account the competitive environment in which workforce development programs
operate. The 1990s were particularly eventful
years for changes in federal policy related to welfare and workforce. Policy shifts reduced funding for education and training and signaled an
emphasis on work-first strategies. JI sites, while
receiving substantial philanthropic resources, still
needed to leverage public funding and foster partnerships, which in turn required them to demonstrate their comparative effectiveness.
The JI was successful in many respects, and
the focus on retention drove better results in a
number of sites. What was not so successful was
getting workforce systems and other nonprofits
to adopt more robust retention measures. The
JI’s key metric was not adopted more broadly,
and using it ended up disadvantaging grantees.
This was a lost opportunity to engage in a debate
about the preferred outcomes of workforce
investments. Lack of common metrics remains a
big problem in the workforce field. This motivated the Casey Foundation to invest in the
Benchmarking project of Public/Private Ventures as a next-generation effort to grapple with
workforce metrics.
A Goal Too Far?
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is arguably the most successful and popular US poverty
alleviation program of the past several decades
(Annie E. Casey Foundation [AECF], 2007).
Started under President Ford and expanded during with 1990s, the EITC now represents a federal
investment of more than $40 billion, an average
of about $1,600 per eligible household, and lifts
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five million families out of poverty each year
(AECF, 2007). The EITC rewards working adults
in families with children and tapers off as household income rises. Although estimates of overall
EITC eligibility and take-up are challenging, given
data availability and changing economic conditions, a commonsense rule of thumb is that about
80% of eligible households take advantage of the
EITC. Take-up is lower for those with the lowest
incomes, the most isolated, and non-English
speakers.

Though the use of “robust” metrics
encouraged learning about jobretention strategies, it took place
in a somewhat self-contained
hothouse environment that did
not reflect what other investors
required. Rather than encouraging
other public and private investors
to change their ways and adopt
more meaningful indicators, the JI
inadvertently encouraged its sites
to keep double books to satisfy the
demands of JI funders and others
who were not involved.
The delivery mechanism for most EITC recipients is private tax preparers, such as H&R Block,
that charge several hundred dollars to prepare
and submit returns and frequently lure EITC
recipients into taking out rapid anticipation loans
(RALs), which are high-cost loans that allow for
immediate access to tax refunds. By contrast,
the VITA free tax-preparation movement relies
on volunteers and public and private financing
and accounts for about 5% of EITC submissions.
Twenty-three states have legislated state-level
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EITCs, and policy advocates are now seeking to
deepen the federal credit and expand eligibility to
noncustodial fathers.
Foundations of all sizes have jumped on the EITC
bandwagon, supporting every aspect of the work,
and even forming an EITC Funders Network.
One of the newest entrants is the United Way
of America with its Financial Stability Partnership. All of these funders support VITA’s free
tax-preparation services or other low-cost
alternatives, and each claims to have had a large
impact, as measured by tax returns filed and
money refunded. Some of this reporting hoopla
is misleading because many EITC recipients are
merely abandoning paid commercial services in
favor of free tax services, thus producing savings
in tax preparation costs and fees. In reality, those
costs are now simply borne by others, notably
foundations. The other underreported aspect of
these big numbers is that almost half of the tax
returns submitted by tax-credit campaigns are
from low-income taxpayers who are not EITCeligible. This is a worthy service, but it does not
foster an influx of additional income as promised
in the advertising for investing in EITC campaigns. Misleading reporting about EITC impact
is a first mistake.
Many funders, including the Casey Foundation,
supported EITC campaigns, not only because
they extended the reach and affordability of an
important public benefit or work support but
also because they saw them as mechanisms to
help low-income people build financial assets.
The Casey Foundation’s campaign slogans, Earn
It! Keep It! Save It!, or, more ambitiously, Earn It!
Keep It! Grow It!, conveyed the hoped-for linkage
between tax credits and asset building, in which
families work toward positive net savings. Foundations hoped most optimistically that people
would take their EITC returns, sign up for Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) through
which a nonprofit would match their savings, and
eventually buy homes. Saving residents from high
fees and predatory loans through free tax preparation would accelerate family asset building, an
essential element for family economic success.
Therefore, local tax credit campaigns, at least in
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their start-up phase, crammed their tax sites with
bank offerings, benefit screenings, financial education, and reams of paper about asset-building
products and services.
As data about campaigns has been gathered
and reflected on, the challenges of reaching this
asset-building goal have become more apparent.
A lot of people getting their taxes done already
had bank accounts. In addition, those who did
establish accounts as part of the tax-preparation service did not always maintain them for
long and frequently maintained transactional
banking relationships with alternative financial
service providers such as private check cashers.
Most people also did not take up asset-building
services and products at tax sites at the time of
tax preparation; they were there merely to get
their taxes done. Likewise, many people saw
themselves as taxpayers, not as public benefit
recipients. Tax sites compiled lists of potential
participants who might return throughout the
year for an array of services, but tracking the
impact of these asset-building services has been
difficult.
The asset-building mistake resulted, in part, because of the clunky and time-consuming ways the
public sector and nonprofits sometimes deliver services. Two innovations, however, have the potential
to overcome the cognitive overload and identity
issues that, among other factors, seem to prevent
people from asset building in the EITC moment
— refund splitting and the availability of online
savings bond options. Both of these administrative
and product innovations allow EITC recipients to
take immediate, albeit small, asset-building steps.
Yet another lesson was that many EITC recipients
are ensnared in debt and other financial traps; campaigns need to help people get their heads above
water before asset building can begin.
Foundations and tax credit campaigns have
not given up on the goal of asset building, but
experience has shown that doing so during tax
preparation season is easier said than done. This
instructive story, ultimately, is about using data
and analysis to uncover mistaken assumptions
and goals and to undertake several rounds of
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self-evaluation are key ingredients for building this capacity. It must be acknowledged,
however, that nonprofit partners often have
different and perhaps harsher expectations
and feedback than do foundations when things
go astray.
• Understand the dilemmas created by foundation investment designs. Foundations not only
need to be clear about their assumptions and
What Can Foundations Improve?
the findings they are based on, they also need
Two cross-cutting themes emerge from the misto engage in discussions with grantees and
take examples discussed above — learning and
others about the general and specific tensions
adaptation. The ALFI undertaking neither learned
produced by high-engagement investing.
nor adapted, although it did invest much energy
and many resources. The JI’s mistake regarding its
outcome measure limited broad adoption of new
retention metrics, but the real adaptation only ocLearning and adaptation should
curred with subsequent foundation investments.
go together. Learning emphasizes
Finally, the tax campaign and asset-building
mistake reflect both learning and adaptation,
the ability to seek and accept
although the story is far from complete.
additional innovation and research to get it right.
In this case, the IRS’s administrative reform,
pushed by the nonprofit sector, has allowed split
refunds for savings instruments. It may turn out
in the long run, however, that the worthy goal of
encouraging refund splitting and savings is not
achievable in tax campaigns.

Learning and adaptation should go together.
Learning emphasizes the ability to seek and accept information from the environment, including information that calls into question operating
assumptions. Learning is about testing these
assumptions with some rigor and with attention
to short-term corrective adjustments and longterm lessons. Adaptation is the ability to take
lessons of this sort and to reformulate theories of
change, project designs, and partnerships. This
may involve adding or subtracting program elements, disinvesting in a project or prototype, or
redesigning partnerships.
Learning and adaptation represent important
aspects of ongoing social investment. Indeed, this
process must ultimately become a part of foundation and initiative culture — the deep-seated
values and habits shaping everyday activities.
Foundations can do several things to improve
learning and adaptation:
• Invest directly in the capacity of nonprofits to
learn and adapt. Such investments involve recognizing the extra resources needed to build
this capacity and to overcome resistance to
self-evaluation. Long-term investments, tolerance for mistakes, peer learning, and investor
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information from the environment,
including information that
calls into question operating
assumptions. Adaptation is the
ability to take lessons of this
sort and to reformulate theories
of change, project designs, and
partnerships.

• Anticipate mistakes for different investment
arenas and at different stages of investment.
Many mistakes, including our examples, were
constructive in most cases, but they were not
unfamiliar or esoteric. Others had faced these
problems. Foundations need to be much more
aware of the types of mistakes likely to stem
from social innovations, and they must be on
guard for the unintended consequences that
inevitably arise. We do not suggest that all mistakes can be avoided, but higher levels of recognition at the outset of investments may help
mitigate the damage of mistakes and improve
the process of learning and adaptation.

123

Giloth and Gewirtz

Conclusion
Philanthropy provides high-risk financial resources to help solve messy social problems
and improve our overall quality of life. This role
involves not only generating social innovations,
but also discovering how they can be adopted
and spread throughout society. There is no triedand-true road map for this role, and foundations
confront multiple dilemmas in mission, culture,
and operational strategies. Hence, philanthropy
inevitably makes mistakes.
Some observers question whether foundations
really take enough risks and whether they are
open and forthcoming about their mistakes and
what they have learned. Unfortunately, sharing
mistakes openly is not always embraced as contributing to or advancing knowledge and effective
practice. In fact, sharing mistakes — as welcome
as it can be in the business world — may produce
negative feedback and contribute to skepticism
about efficient nonprofit practices. This intolerance of mistakes encourages a resistance to the
evaluation and documentation that are a foundation for learning. The recent discussion of foundation failures has the potential to reshape these
perceptions and encourage a more open dialogue
about investments that didn’t work out.
Sharing mistakes is about both transparency
and learning. It is at the heart of the knowledgegeneration role of foundations that is so important for social innovation and effective policy
development. Foundations have the unique ability
to demonstrate how sharing mistakes — or even
failures — and lessons can be done effectively and
in a timely manner. Not to take up this challenge
would be the biggest mistake of all.
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